Still in the Game

Cantal
Melouk, Kouachi, Beghal, and Laidouni hitting the soccer field in Cantal, France, on 4/4/2011

In my last post, I mentioned that I had decided to take one individual from an old plot—in this case, Slimane Khalfaoui from the 2000 Strasbourg Cathedral/Christmas Market plot—and research what had become of him.  I ended up going off on a tangent and looking at Rabah Boukaouma, a conspirator most recently with respect to the Sid Ahmed Ghlam affair. Continue reading

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The Courage of our Youth Was Witnessed in Aden (Part III)

(FILES) This US Navy file photo shows US
USS COLE, YEMEN: (FILES) This US Navy file photo shows US Navy and Marine Corps security personnel patrolling past the damaged US Navy destroyer USS Cole 18 October 2000 following the 12 October 2000 terrorist bombing attack on the ship in Aden, Yemen. Abdel Rahim al-Nashiri and Jamal Mohammed al-Bedawi, the two Al-Qaeda suspects convicted for the bombing, were sentenced to death September 29, 2004 by a Yemeni court. Four other suspects were given ten years in prison. AFP PHOTO/US NAVY PHOTO/Lyle G. BECKER (Photo credit should read LYLE G. BECKER/AFP/Getty Images)

Part III: The Revolving Door and the Legal Aftermath

The Revolving Door

By the spring of 2003 all of the major players in the conspiracy, so far as we know them from open source material, had been caught except for Khallad.  He would be captured at the end of April.  Khallad and al-Nashiri were in the hands of the Americans and would disappear into the system of black sites being run by the CIA, a history which continues to frustrate the ultimate disposition of the two detainees.  The rest would remain in the hands of the Yemenis, which brought its own set of problems.  The detainment in Yemen’s penal system of individuals suspected of involvement in the Cole bombing has been nothing short of exasperating for the United States.  The years since have been an unending series of high-profile prison breaks, sentence reductions, and early releases or loose “house arrests” based on promises of future good behavior.  President Saleh deserves a great deal of the discredit for this.  His government often lurched between competing policies of cooperation and resistance with US law enforcement agencies depending upon the requirements of the domestic situation.  Furthermore, his security services were riddled with individuals sympathetic to al-Qaeda, if not outright supportive.  In certain cases, such as Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman al-Hilal, these turned out to be actual members of the group. Continue reading